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The Debt Maturity Structure of Small Firms in a Creditor 
Oriented Environment 
Abstract 
Once a firm decides to issue debt, the characteristics of this debt instrument should be 
considered. One of the critical decisions involves debt maturity. Using a sample of 1091 
Belgian small firms from 1996 until 2000, this study analyses the determinants of the corporate 
debt-maturity structure of small firms in a creditor-oriented system. Consistent with previous 
empirical evidence on large firms, the present results strongly support the maturity-matching 
principle. The hypothesis that firms with many growth opportunities will borrow on the short 
term as a response to the under-investment problem, is not supported. There is a clear relation 
between the credit worthiness of a firm and the debt-maturity structure. Firms with a better 
credit score borrow on the long term, whereas firms with a poor credit quality are apparently 
forced to borrow on the short term. This evidence contradicts the expected U-shaped 
relationship between credit worthiness and debt maturity. Size negatively influences debt 
maturity.  
Keywords: debt maturity, capital structure, small firms 
 
JEL classification: G32 
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1. Introduction 
As Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated implicitly, and as Stiglitz (1974) demonstrated explicitly, both 
the capital structure of a firm and debt maturity are irrelevant in perfect capital markets. In other 
words, decisions concerning the maturity of a debt contracted by a firm can never augment the value 
of a firm. To prove this, Stiglitz (1974), as well as Modigliani and Miller (1958), made a number of 
assumptions. These included: (i) the absence of taxes; (ii) that default is not possible; and (iii) that 
personal lending is equivalent to corporate lending. Several theoretical papers have discussed the 
influence of so-called imperfections on the corporate debt-maturity structure. Myers (1977) 
demonstrated the importance of growth opportunities. Other important theoretical contributions have 
been those of Brick and Ravid (1985, 1991), Diamond (1991, 1993), and Flannery (1986). Empirical 
evidence has been provided by Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer 
(1996), Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Ozkan (2000), and Scherr and Hulburt (2001)  
In the present paper, the determinants of the corporate debt-maturity structure of small firms in a 
creditor-oriented system are investigated. The present analysis adds to the existing literature in two 
important ways. 
• This is a study of small firms. Most studies of debt-maturity structure have used a sample of 
large, and often quoted firms. The only previous study to have employed data on small firms 
appears to have been that of Scherr and Hulburt (2001). Because small firms differ from 
large firms in several characteristics (for example, ownership structure, flexibility, taxes), 
their financing options and methods are also quite different. For these reasons, a specific 
study of the maturity structure of small firms is appropriate. 
 
• The present study uses data from a country with a creditor-oriented system. The only other 
study also focusing on a creditor-oriented system was that of Cai, Cheun and Goyal (1999) 
who investigated the determinants of the maturity of public debt issues in Japan. Because 
they examined public debt issues, their sample also included larger firms. Other authors have 
focused on listed firms in a market-oriented system (see Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay 
and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) for studies in the 
United States, and Ozkan (2000) for studies in the United Kingdom). This is a significant 
issue for consideration because it is often argued that banks are better monitors of debt, and 
can mitigate agency problems. Taken together, these factors influence debt maturity. 
The main findings of the present analysis, based on a sample of 4,506 firm-year observations for 
1,091 small Belgian firms for the period from 1996 to 2000, are that:  
• the maturity-matching principle is the most important determinant of the debt-maturity 
structure; 
• growth options do not seem to influence debt maturity; 
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• the better the credit worthiness of a firm, the longer the borrowing period they utilise; and 
• larger firms borrow on a shorter term than smaller firms. 
The maturity-matching principle has been strongly supported in other empirical work, whereas 
evidence on the influence of growth opportunities has been mixed. The relationship presented here 
between credit worthiness and debt maturity is unique in the empirical literature. The empirical 
evidence on the influence of size has been mixed, with both positive and negative relationships having 
been reported. 
The remainder of the present paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, a concise literature 
review is provided, and hypotheses are proposed. Section 3 provides information on the sample. 
Section 4 discusses the variables, and Section 5 discusses the estimation model used in the empirical 
analysis. In Section 6, the empirical results are presented. Section 7 provides a summarising 
conclusion to the study. 
2. Literature review and research hypotheses 
2.1 The choice of debt maturity 
Morris (1976) has argued that firms try to match the maturity of assets and liabilities because this 
reduces the risk that incoming cash flows might be insufficient to cover interest payments and capital 
outlays. Debt with a maturity shorter than the maturity of assets is risky because the assets might not 
have yielded enough profit to repay the debt. Debt with a maturity longer than the maturity of the 
assets is also risky because debt might have to be repaid after the assets have ceased to yield income. 
Consequently, firms try to match the maturities of assets and debt. This is known as ‘maturity 
matching’. This leads to the following hypothesis being proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms try to match the maturity of assets with that of liabilities. 
According to Myers (1977), reducing debt maturity is an attempt to solve the problem of under 
investment. He argued that, under debt financing, it is possible that managers might not carry out 
investments with a positive net present value. When leverage is high, residual claims will be very low 
and profits from investments will benefit only creditors. Because shareholders will not earn a  fair 
return, they will be reluctant to pursue future investments, which reduces the investment opportunity 
set and, because firm value equals the value of assets in place and the value of the investment 
opportunity set, ultimately also reduces firm value. The under-investment problem is of course more 
severe when a firm has more growth opportunities. Myers (1977) has suggested some solutions to this 
under-investment problem. One solution consists of reducing the maturity of debt. Issuing debt that 
matures before an investment opportunity can be carried out will not lead to under investment. Long-
term debt is thus best achieved by rolling over short-term debt. This leads to the following hypothesis 
being proposed:  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with high growth opportunities borrow on the short term. 
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Other solutions to the under-investment problem are: (i) reducing the amount of debt in the 
capital structure; or (ii) including restrictive covenants in the debt agreement. 
Diamond (1991) focused on the relationship between debt maturity and the credit worthiness of 
a firm. A key concept in his theory is liquidity risk. Diamond defined liquidity risk as the risk that a 
debtor will lose control rents because creditors do not want to refinance, and therefore choose to 
liquidate the firm. Control rents are then defined as the difference between the profits of a project and 
the payments to the debtor. Because short-term debt was seen by Diamond as being debt that matures 
before the profits of an investment are received, it is necessary to refinance short-term debt. The 
possibility of refinancing depends on the willingness of the creditors, which, in turn, depends on the 
new credit worthiness of the debtor. If refinancing is impossible, assets have to be sold to meet 
obligations. In this way, part of the control rents are lost. Of course, this has a negative influence on 
profitability. For firms with a high credit worthiness, the liquidity risk is not relevant. A decrease of 
their credit worthiness does not lead to a ‘crunch’ of credit to the firm. For this reason, firms with a 
high credit rating are expected to borrow on the short term. For firms with a medium credit rating, the 
liquidity risk can be of importance. If their credit worthiness decreases, creditors could refuse to 
extend the loan. They might take control of the firm and, perhaps, liquidate it. Firms that are afraid 
that this might happen borrow on the long term. Firms with a low credit rating also like to borrow on 
the long term. However, creditors do not want to lend their money on a long-term basis to borrowers 
of this kind. Firms with a low credit rating are therefore forced to borrow on the short term.   
Hypothesis 3: A non monotomous relation exists between credit worthiness and 
debt maturity. Firms with low and high credit worthiness borrow on the short 
term, whereas firm with medium credit worthiness borrow on the long term.  
According to Smith and Warner (1979), there is a greater chance of conflicts between 
shareholders and debtors in smaller firms. Examples are the under-investment problem and the asset-
substitution problem, which occurs when managers invest in more risky assets than that which was 
originally agreed upon (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 1980). In a small firm, the manager usually holds 
a large proportion of the equity. Actions that benefit the shareholders will therefore also benefit the 
manager. Because the manager controls the actions of the firm, managers of small firms could be more 
likely to take risks than managers in large firms. Because these problems can be reduced by issuing 
short-term debt, a positive relation between firm size and debt maturity is proposed (we admit that 
firm size is perhaps not the most convenient measure for manager ownership, but we lack better 
indications on manager ownership) :  
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between size and debt maturity. 
In most cases, the issuing costs of a public debt issue are fixed, and these costs are therefore 
independent of the magnitude of the debt. This enables economies of scale. For this reason, larger 
firms are especially likely to issue public debt. Because public debt has a longer maturity than private 
debt, a positive relation between the size of a firm and the maturity of debt is proposed. However, this 
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reasoning does not apply to small unlisted firms, because these firms make very little use of public 
debt.    
The present study also includes leverage and industry affiliation as determinants of debt 
maturity. Myers (1977) argued that the under-investment problem could also be solved by reducing 
leverage. It can also be expected that capital structure is, to some extent, sector-dependent.  
2.2 The debt maturity choice for small firms in a creditor-oriented environment 
As noted above, the present study specifically addresses small firms in a creditor-oriented system. The 
relationship between this sample and the hypotheses (proposed above) is now considered. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms try to match the maturity of assets with that of liabilities. 
Small firms are more common in the wholesale, retail, and service sectors, whereas large firms 
are more common in manufacturing. Because manufacturing involves more fixed investments, the 
maturity of assets in these (larger) firms is likely to be quite different from that of non-manufacturing 
(smaller) firms. However, the motive for matching maturity of assets and liabilities continues to be 
relevant for small firms.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with high growth opportunities borrow on the short term. 
 
Petit and Singer (1985) argued that debt-related agency problems (such as the under-investment 
problem) appear to be potentially more serious in smaller firms. This is supported by the fact that 
smaller firms face more significant problems of asymmetric information—because most small firms do 
not supply audited financial statements. In addition, smaller firms have more flexibility, which 
exacerbates problems such as the asset-substitution problem. This suggests shorter debt maturities for 
small firms. Among others, Berlin and Loeys (1988) have argued that banks are better in monitoring 
firms than are other lenders. If bank lending does mitigate agency problems, then there could be less 
need to shorten debt maturity.  
Hypothesis 3: A non monotomous relation exists between credit worthiness and 
debt maturity. Firms with low and high credit worthiness borrow on the short 
term, whereas firm with medium credit worthiness borrow on the long term.  
 
An important concept in the theory of Diamond (1991), who proposed the above hypothesis, is 
that of liquidity risk. To avoid liquidation, firms with a medium creditworthiness will contract long-
term debt. However, it can be argued that banks are more willing to renegotiate on contracts than are 
non-bank lenders (Hoshi, Kashyap, Scharfstein, 1990). If so, liquidity risk decreases for bank 
borrowers. This induces bank borrowers who have a medium credit worthiness to borrow on a shorter 
term than non-bank borrowers, for whom liquidity risk is still an important concern. 
Hypothesis 4: Size has a positive effect on debt maturity 
Because agency problems are worse in small, owner-managed firms, and because shortening 
debt maturity is a solution for such agency problems, the present paper argues that a positive relation 
 7
is to be expected between size and debt maturity. However, because the present sample consists 
entirely of small firms, it is possible that most of these firms are owned by their managers. In this case, 
the expected relation will not be observed. 
3. Sample  
 
The data used to construct the sample for the present study were gathered from the Belfirst DVD of 
Bureau Van Dijk. This DVD is the repository of the annual accounts of the firms that deposit their 
accounts with the central reserve bank of Belgium. In Belgium, firms with limited liability 
(irrespective of their size), have a legal duty to deposit their annual accounts in a prescribed format. A 
distinction is made between firms that have to prepare their annual accounts in a complete format and 
firms that are allowed to prepare their annual accounts in an abbreviated format. A firm has to use the 
complete format if it has more than 100 employees or if it satisfies at least two of the following 
criteria: number of employees (yearly average) of at least 50, turnover (value-added tax excluded) of 
at least 200 million Belgium Francs (BEF) (4,957,880 Euro (EUR)) and total assets of at least 100 
million BEF (=2,478,940 EUR). 
 
 The firms in our population had to satisfy the following conditions: (i) be required to deposit an 
abbreviated account; (ii) have submitted an account in every year from 1996 until 2000; (iii) have at 
least one employee (because the existence of firms without employees is merely driven by fiscal 
motivations); and (iv) not belong to the financial sector or governmental sector. Financial firms were 
excluded because, due to capital requirements, decisions concerning capital and maturity structure 
could be affected by other factors. Governmental firms were also excluded because, as Smith (1986) 
has argued, managers in governmental firms have less discretion concerning investments than do 
managers in non-governmental, and thus, less regulated firms.  
From this population, we drew a random sample of 1,200 firms. Observations with missing values 
were discarded.  Outliers were filtered in the following way: (i) the percentage of long-term debt and 
the percentage of fixed assets could not exceed 100%; and (ii) the short-term default indicator could 
not exceed 1. The proxies for growth opportunities were filtered by removing the upper and lower 
0.5% percentile. Thus, a sample of 4,506 firm-year observations from 1,091 firms for the period from 
1996 to 2000 was obtained. 
4. Variables 
4.1 Variable definition 
Guedes and Opler (1996) noted that there are two empirical approaches to investigating the 
determinants of debt maturity. The first is to investigate the maturity of individual debt issues. 
However, this approach was problematic with the sample of small firms utilised in the present study 
because none of the firms made use of public debt issues, and because databases of issues of bank debt 
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were not accessible. The second approach involves the use of cumulative data from the annual 
account, and this was the approach followed here. 
Debt maturity was measured in terms of the percentage of total debt outstanding. Amounts 
payable in more than one year were added to the current portion of amounts payable after one year, 
and this was divided by the total debt outstanding, with the result being expressed as a percentage. It 
was therefore calculated as follows: 
 
debtTotal
yearoneafterpayableamountsofportionCurrentyearonethanmoreinpayableAmountsLtdebt +=%  
 
Debt that matured within one year but that had an original maturity of more than one year was 
also included in the measure of long-term debt (because this was issued with a long-term intention). 
An alternative dependent variable was also specified in which only financial debt was considered. 
However, results were very similar using this alternative specification. 
The maturity of assets was measured by the percentage of total assets that was fixed. 
i
i
i assetstotal
assetsfixed
inmaturityasset =%)(  
It is very difficult to measure growth opportunities for a sample of non-listed firms. Previous 
studies using data from listed firms have focused on Tobin’s Q as a proxy for growth opportunities. 
This measure could not be used here because the firms in the present sample were not quoted. Growth 
opportunities therefore had to be proxied in other ways.  
As a first variable, following Scherr and Hulburt (2001), the present study used past growth in 
total assets. Growth opportunities in a given year were thus calculated as the geometric average of the 
yearly growth in total assets over the three preceding years. In this approach, it is assumed that firms 
that grew faster in the past also have greater opportunities for future growth.  
Secondly, the ratio of capital expenditures to asset book value was used. Kallapur and Trombley 
(1999) concluded that, for non-listed firms, this measure best captures ex post realised growth. Growth 
opportunities in a given year were proxied as the ratio of capital expenditures on asset book value in 
the same year. 
3
4
41
−
−−
−
=
i
ii
i assetstotal
assetstotalassetstotal
growthAsset  
i
i
i assetstotal
assetsfixedinsinvestmentNew
endituresCapital =exp  
 
Credit worthiness of a firm is often proxied by ratings offered by agencies such as Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s. However, none of the firms in the present sample had such a rating. This 
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study therefore used a short-term default risk indicator, based on the OJD score, which is a 
multivariate logit score for failure prediction. This score was developed for Belgian firms as an 
alternative to the linear Altman’s Z score (Ooghe, Joos and de Bourdeaudhuij, 1995). Scores for the 
short-term default indicator are between 0 (financially healthy firm), and 1 (financially distressed 
firm). 
ii scoreOJDtermshortstdefault −= 1  
The non monotomous relation between debt maturity and credit worthiness was tested in two 
ways. First, both STDEFAULT and the square of the STDEFAULT were included as variables. If the 
relationship between default risk and debt maturity is parabolic, as Diamond (1991) proposed, the 
coefficient of the default risk should be positive and the coefficient of the square should be negative.  
In the second approach, dummies were used to classify the firms into three categories according 
to their default risk. Firms with a low default risk (high credit worthiness) were taken to be those 
situated below the 33rd percentile (dumsthi), firms with a medium default risk (and medium credit 
worthiness) were taken to be those between the 33rd and 66th percentile (dumstme). The upper 33% of 
the firms were viewed as firms with a high default risk (dumstlo). To avoid the dummy trap, only two 
of the three dummies could be included in the regression. The sign expected for the different dummies 
thus depends on the dummies that were entered in the regression.  
1672.01
1672.00425.01
0425.01
>=
<≤=
<=
stdefaultifdumstlo
stdefaultifdumstme
stdefaultifdumsthi
 
Although size can be measured in several ways, the present study used the natural logarithm of 
total assets and the natural logarithm of added value. 
Table 1 presents an overview of the hypotheses, the variables, and the hypothesised signs. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
4.2 Descriptives 
Table 2 depicts descriptive statistics of the variables. On average, 47.7 % of the debt issued was long-
term debt, with the median being 46.0%. The average proportion of fixed assets to total assets, at 
46.1%, was close to the proportion of long-term debt. Standard deviation of the percentage long-term 
debt was also remarkably close to the standard deviation of the percentage of fixed assets, with the 
values being 26.2% and 27.2% respectively. This was the first indication that the maturity-matching 
principle is apposite. Past growth, which was this study’s measure of growth opportunities, was fairly 
high, with the mean being 6%. This figure was twice the median, which amounts to 3%. This indicated 
the influence of some high-growth firms (which could also be deduced from the maximum,  which 
amounts to 99%). The same picture emerged when capital expenditures were used as a proxy for 
 10
growth opportunities. On average, new investments in fixed assets accounted for 7% of total assets. 
The median firm spent an amount equivalent to 3% of total assets. 
The average size of the firms in the present sample, measured by total assets, was 756,340 EUR. 
A very large variance was observed, with the minimum being 13,000 EUR and the maximum being 
32,849,000 EUR. This led to a median that was very different from the average observation of 387.000 
EUR. The same conclusion was drawn when examining added value. Firms in the present sample were 
somewhat smaller than those in the sample of Scherr and Hulburt (2001). They used four subsamples, 
in which the mean of total assets ranged from $1 million to $2 million. 
The average leverage ratio was 68.7%, and the median was 72.3%. This leverage ratio was 
substantially higher than in most other empirical studies. This is due to the fact that the present sample 
was drawn from a banking-oriented environment in which debt is used more frequently. In addition, 
the measure of leverage used in the present study not only includes financial debt, but also other 
categories of debt (such as trade debt). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
5. Estimation model 
Because the present data included observations of firms over five years, panel data analysis techniques 
could be used. Baltagi (1995) has argued that panel data have several benefits. The greatest advantage 
of panel data to the present study is that they allow control for individual heterogeneity. Panel data 
suggest that firms are heterogeneous. Because time series and cross-section studies do not control for 
this heterogeneity, the estimation results could be biased. Panel data analysis allows a consideration of 
a firm-specific time-invariant effect. The analysis can be run by either a fixed-effects model or a 
random-effects model. The fixed-effects model can, in general terms, be described by the following 
equation: 
ititiit Bxy εα ++=
'   
in which αi represents an unknown firm-specific constant, which is referred to as a ‘fixed 
effect’. 
The alternative, the random-effects model, is described as follows: 
ititit Bxy εα ++=
'  
To determine which of these regressions should be run, the Hausman test can be used. This test 
examines whether the difference between the estimators generated by random-effects regression and 
the estimators generated by fixed-effects regression approximates zero. In other words: H0 = random 
effects and HA = fixed effects. (In the present analysis H0 was rejected (p < 0.0001), which means that 
the fixed-effects model was to be preferred.) 
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As a check for robustness, run pooled OLS-regressions were also run, as were cross-sectional 
OLS-regressions (in which the observations were the time-series means of the different firms). 
6. Results 
6.1 Correlations 
Table 3 shows the correlations among the various variables. These results again demonstrate 
preliminary evidence of the significance of the matching principle—in that the correlation between the 
maturity of assets and the percentage of long-term debt equalled 62 % (which was statistically 
significant at the 1% level). The correlation between the credit worthiness of the firm and the 
percentage of long-term debt was very slightly positive (but this was not significant). The variables 
measuring growth opportunities of a firm correlated negatively with the percentage of long-term debt, 
which is in line with the findings of Myers (1977). Asset growth was significant at the 5% level, 
whereas capital expenditures were not significant. There was a very low (and insignificant) positive 
correlation between total assets and long-term debt, whereas the correlation between added value and 
long-term debt was strongly negative, and very significant. Because both these measures attempt to 
capture the size of a firm, no clear picture emerged from this analysis. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
6.2 Regression results 
6.2.1 Fixed-effects regression results 
 
Table 4 depicts the results of the fixed-effects regressions. Hypothesis 1 (which proposed that firms 
seek to match the maturities of assets and liabilities) was strongly confirmed. In every regression, the 
MATACT coefficient was significant at the 1% level. Maturity matching was undoubtedly the most 
important factor in choosing between short-term and long-term debt. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Myers’ hypothesis—that firms with significant growth opportunities borrow on the short term—
was not confirmed. The coefficients of past growth in assets (regression (1)) and capital expenditures 
(regression (2)) were not significant. Growth options, and the associated under-investment problem, 
do not seem to have influenced decisions concerning corporate debt maturity. However, caution is 
required before rejecting the under-investment hypothesis. It is doubtful whether past growth is a good 
measure of future growth options. 
The coefficient of STDEFAULT (the measure of credit worthiness in this study) was 
significantly negative, whereas the square of this variable had a significant positive coefficient. This 
was not in accordance with Hypothesis 3, which predicted a non monotomous, U-shaped relation 
between debt maturity and credit worthiness—whereby good and bad firms borrow on the short term, 
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whereas firms of medium quality borrow on the long term. Figure 1 graphically shows the empirical 
relationship. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
The relation was U-shaped. However, the lowest value on the parabolic curve is situated at 
minus the coefficient of the variable divided by two times the square of this coefficient. In all the 
regressions, this figure was higher than 60%. Because most of the observations were below this level 
(with the 95% percentile being situated at a stdefault value of 0.55), it can be concluded that the debt 
maturity was a constantly increasing function of credit worthiness. This was confirmed by the 
coefficients of the dummy variables used to classify the firms according to their credit rating 
(regression (4)). The firms belonging to the category with the highest credit score clearly borrowed on 
a longer term. The firms with a low credit score borrowed more on the short term. Either way, there 
was no evidence for the non monotomous relation between credit score and debt maturity, as proposed 
by Diamond (1991). 
The final hypothesis proposed a positive relation between size and debt-maturity structure. The 
results contradicted this proposition (but confirmed the results of Scherr and Hulburt (2001) for 
American small firms). The first proxy, the natural logarithm of total assets, yielded a negative 
coefficient which was highly significant at the 1% level (regressions (1) and (2)). Using the alternative 
variable, the natural logarithm of value added, the coefficient was insignificant (regression (4)). 
Leverage, as a control variable, yielded a statistically significant positive coefficient, and was 
therefore shown to exert a positive influence on debt maturity. Higher indebted firms might have 
borrowed on the longer term to ensure that they had earned enough money to be able to repay the 
creditors. Because the industry to which a firm belongs is time-invariant, these dummies could not be 
used as a control variable in a fixed-effects regression. 
6.2.2 Robustness 
To check whether the results were dependent on the regression methodology used, the results of the 
pooled regressions (Table 5) and the cross-sectional regression (Table 6) were analysed. Again, the 
maturity matching principle was supported strongly. The coefficients were positive and significant. 
There is no doubt that maturity matching was very important. Consistent with the results of the fixed-
effects regression, growth opportunities do not seem to have played a role in determining the debt-
maturity structure. When growth opportunities were measured as past growth in total assets, the 
coefficients had the expected negative sign, but they never reached a significant level. When capital 
expenditures were used, coefficients were also negative and sometimes reached the 10% significance 
level. However, this evidence was too weak to conclude that growth options determined the corporate 
debt-maturity structure.  
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The relationship between credit worthiness and debt maturity also appeared to be very robust in 
the applied methodology. For each approach, a positive relationship was deduced—that is, financially 
healthy firms were able to borrow on the longer term, whereas firms with a weak financial condition 
were forced to borrow on the short term. Diamond’s (1991) U-shaped relation was never supported in 
the present analyses. 
The final hypothesis proposed that size has a positive influence on debt maturity. On the basis 
of the alternative regression used here, support was again found for a negative relation—in that the 
coefficients were negative and statistically significant for both total assets and added value. 
A closer analysis of the industry dummies revealed that wholesale and catering firms appeared 
to have borrowed on the shorter term. This result was obtained in both the pooled and the cross-
sectional regression. Because wholesale and catering firms do not produce goods, they can be 
expected to own relatively few fixed assets. Assuming that they matched the maturity of their assets 
and liabilities, this could explain their shorter debt maturity. 
 
Insert Table 5 and Table 6 about here 
 
6.2.3 Comparison with earlier work 
Although comparison with earlier empirical studies is difficult (due to the different environments and 
samples involved), it is nevertheless worthwhile to consider similarities and dissimilarities with earlier 
empirical work. An important observation is that, no matter what kind of firm, or which environment, 
maturity matching is very important. All studies of which the present authors are aware have found 
strong evidence for maturity matching.  
In contrast, the evidence with respect to growth opportunities is mixed, and seems to vary with 
the size of the firms that are studied. Consistent with Scherr and Hulburt (2001), the present study 
found no evidence in support of the growth opportunities hypothesis for small firms. This could be 
interpreted as evidence that banks are good monitors, so that agency problems do not have to be 
solved by reducing debt maturity. This is a very plausible explanation in the context of our Belgian 
system.  Most small firms tend to take loan agreement with a local office of their bank. So, these small 
firms are very like to be closely monitored by these local offices.   
Empirical evidence on large firms has been more supportive of the growth opportunities hypothesis. 
Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Ozkan (2000) all found a negative relation 
between growth opportunities and debt maturity. Stohs and Mauer (1996) also reported this relation. 
However, after controlling for leverage, the growth opportunities coefficient was not significant in the 
present study. 
 
Most studies have indicated that credit worthiness influences debt maturity. Barclay and Smith 
(1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) both supported Diamond’s (1991) hypothesis for large firms, 
 14
whereas Guedes and Opler (1996) concluded that large US firms with a high credit worthiness borrow 
on the short term, and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) found that small US firms with lower default risk 
borrow on the shorter term. This contradicts the present findings, which indicated a positive relation 
between credit worthiness and debt maturity. Because of the high risk, banks will not lend money on 
the long term to weak debtors. The finding that good firms borrow on the long term is consistent with 
that of Graham and Harvey (2001). In their survey of corporate financial policies, issuing long-term 
debt to minimise the risk of having to refinance in “bad” times is the second most important factor 
affecting a choice between short-term and long-term debt (with maturity matching being the most 
important factor). 
A positive relation between size and debt maturity was reported by Barclay and Smith (1995) 
and by Stohs and Mauer (1996). Guedes and Opler (1996) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) found a 
negative relation. The present evidence supports the latter findings. As Scherr and Hulburt (2001) have 
argued, this mixed evidence on size could be caused by the fact that size proxies for several variables 
(such as agency problems, asymmetric information, etc.). 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, four hypotheses concerning the determinants of debt maturity structure were tested in a 
sample of small firms in a creditor-oriented environment. The major concern of the firms in this 
sample seems to have been matching the maturity of assets and liabilities. The maturity-matching 
principle was very strongly supported. Myers’ (1977) hypothesis, suggesting that firms with many 
growth opportunities will borrow on the short term as a response to the under-investment problem, 
was not supported by the present study. There is a clear relation between the credit worthiness of a 
firm and the debt-maturity structure—whereby firms with a better credit score borrowed on the long 
term, whereas firms with a poor credit quality were apparently forced to borrow on the short term. The 
size of a firm plays a role that is in direct contrast to what might be expected from the theoretical 
literature—that larger firms borrow more on the short term. The present findings concerning maturity 
matching, growth opportunities, and size are fairly much in line with earlier empirical work. The 
relation found here between credit worthiness and debt maturity has not been previously reported. 
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Table 1: Hypotheses, variables, expected signs 
 
Hypothesis  Variable expected sign
Firms try to match the maturity of assets with that of liabilities Maturity assets positive 
Firms with high growth opportunities borrow on the short term Growth assets negative 
 Capital expenditures negative 
The relationship between the credit worthiness of a firm and 
the debt maturity is U shaped 
stdefault negative 
 stdefault² positive 
Size has a positive effect on debt maturity ln(total assets) positive 
  ln(added value) positive 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable, %Long-term debt, is the percentage of total debt that was issued 
with a long-term intention—that is, debt that matures in more than one year plus debt that 
matures this year but that had an original maturity of more than one year. Asset maturity 
is the percentage of total assets that are fixed. Asset growth is the geometric average of 
growth in total assets for the three preceding years (in percentage terms). Capital 
expenditures is the ratio of capital expenditures this year divided by total assets of this 
year (in percentage terms). Stdefault is one minus the OJD score (between 0 and 1). 
Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets (in percentage terms). 
a  Percentage 
b  Thousands of EUR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Median
%Long term debta 47.7 26.2 0.0 99.8 46.0
Asset maturitya 46.1 27.2 0.0 1.0 43.7
Asset growtha 6.4 22.8 -86.2 99.3 3.8
Capital expendituresa 7.6 21.7 0.0 98.8 3.4
Short term default 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1
Total assetsb 756.3 1364.4 13.0 32849.0 387.0
Added valueb 243.9 336.1 1.0 5138.0 126.0
Leveragea 68.7 21.7 1.2 99.6 72.3  
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Table 3: Pearson correlation matrix 
 
  Lon
g-
term 
debt 
Mat
urity 
asse
ts 
Gro
wth 
ass
ets 
Ca
pit
al 
ex
pe
ndi
tur
es 
Stde
fault 
Stde
fault
² 
Dum
sthi 
Dum
stm
e 
Du
mst
lo 
Tot
al 
as
set
s 
Ad
de
d 
val
ue 
Le
ver
ag
e 
%Long term 
debt 
1.00             
Asset maturity 0.62*** 1.00            
Asset growth -0.04** -0.06 1.00           
Capital 
expenditures 
-0.03 -0.01 0.01 1.00          
Stdefault 0.01 0.34*** -0.09** 0.01 1.00         
Stdefault² 0.01 0.28*** -0.08** 0.01 0.93*** 1.00        
Dumsthi -0.01 -0.27*** 0.06* -0.02 -0.52*** -0.30*** 1.00       
Dumstme 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.29*** -0.33*** -0.54*** 1.00      
Dumstlo 0.00 0.28 -0.08 0.00 0.83*** 0.66*** -0.40*** -0.55*** 1.00     
Total assets 0.01 0.11** -0.05 0.02 0.10*** 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 0.10 1.00    
Added value -0.17*** -0.13*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.08** -0.08** 0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.42 1.00  
Leverage -0.04 0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.35*** 0.23*** -0.46*** 0.14*** 0.30*** -0.05 -0.08 1.00
The dependent variable %Long-term debt is the percentage of total debt that was issued with 
a long-term intention—that is, debt that matures in more than one year plus debt that matures 
this year but that had an original maturity of more than one year. Asset maturity is the 
percentage of total assets that are fixed. Asset growth is the geometric average of growth in 
total assets for the three preceding years (in percentage terms). Capital expenditures is the 
ratio of capital expenditures this year divided by total assets of this year  (in percentage 
terms).Stdefault is one minus the OJD score (between 0 and 1), stdefault² is the square of 
stdefault. Dumsthi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when  stdefault score is below 0.0425, 
and 0 otherwise. Dumstme is a dummy variable that equals 1 when stdefault score is between 
0.0425 and 0.1672, and 0 otherwise. Dumstlo is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stdefault 
exceeds 0.1672. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets (in percentage 
terms).   
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level respectively. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Results of fixed-effects regressions 
 
 
Total assets + -0.01 
(-2.98)*** 
-0.01 
(-2.94)*** 
  
Added value +   -0.00 
(-0.86) 
-0.00 
(-0.82) 
Leverage  0.10 
(3.95)*** 
0.10 
(3.95)*** 
0.10 
(4.13)*** 
0.08 
(3.64)*** 
Adjusted R²  77.0% 77..4% 77.1% 82.3% 
The dependent variable %Long-term debt is the percentage of total debt that was issued with a long-term 
intention—that is, debt that matures in more than one year plus debt that matures this year but that had 
an original maturity of more than one year. Asset maturity is the percentage of total assets that are fixed. 
Asset growth is the geometric average of growth in total assets for the three preceding years (in 
percentage terms). Capital expenditures is the ratio of capital expenditures this year divided by total 
assets of this year (in percentage terms). Ln(Total assets) equals the natural logarithm of total assets, 
ln(added value) equals the natural logarithm of added value. Stdefault is one minus the OJD score 
(between 0 and 1), stdefault² is the square of stdefault. Dumsthi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when  
stdefault score is below 0.0425, and 0 otherwise. Dumstme is a dummy variable that equals 1 when 
stdefault score is between 0.0425 and 0.1672, and 0 otherwise. Dumstlo is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if stdefault exceeds 0.1672. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets.  
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level respectively. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent variable Expected 
sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Asset maturity  + 0.60 
(25.62)*** 
0.60 
(25.63)*** 
0.59 
(25.48)*** 
0.58 
(23.32)*** 
Asset growth - -0.00 
(-0.43) 
  -0.00 
(0.35) 
Capital expenditures -  0.00 
(0.09) 
0.00 
(0.16) 
 
Stdefault + -0.30 
(-6.87)*** 
-0.30 
(-6.87)*** 
-0.30 
(-6.81)*** 
 
Stdefault² - 0.17 
(3.10)*** 
0.18 
(3.11)*** 
0.18 
(3.11)*** 
 
Dumstme     -0.03 
(-4.12)*** 
Dumstlo     -0.07 
(-7.42)*** 
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Table 5: Results of pooled regressions 
 
Total assets + -0.02 
(-4.05)*** 
-0.02 
(-4.08)*** 
  
Added value +   -0.03 
(-6.42)*** 
-0.03 
(-6.12)*** 
Leverage  0.01 
(0.48) 
0.01 
(0.43) 
0.04 
(1.17) 
0.05 
(1.55) 
Dumman  0.00 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
0.01 
(0.81) 
0.01 
(0.69) 
Dumwho  -0.04 
(-2.39)*** 
-0.04 
(-2.33)*** 
-0.04 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.04 
(-2.70)*** 
Dumret  -0.01  
(-0.82) 
-0.01  
(-0.60) 
-0.02 
(-1.22) 
-0.02 
(-1.39) 
Dumcat  -0.06 
(-2.56)*** 
-0.06 
(-2.48)** 
-0.05 
(-2.12)** 
-0.06 
(-2.41)*** 
Adjusted R²  49.0% 49.1% 50.7% 49.9% 
The dependent variable %Long-term debt is the percentage of total debt that was issued with a long-term 
intention—that is, debt that matures in more than one year plus debt that matures this year but that had 
an original maturity of more than one year. Asset maturity is the percentage of total assets that are fixed. 
Asset growth is the geometric average of growth in total assets for the three preceding years (in 
percentage terms). Capital expenditures is the ratio of capital expenditures this year divided by total 
assets of this year (in percentage terms). Ln(Total assets) equals the natural logarithm of total assets, 
ln(added value) equals the natural logarithm of added value. Stdefault is one minus the OJD score 
(between 0 and 1), stdefault² is the square of stdefault. Dumsthi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when  
stdefault score is below 0.0425, and 0 otherwise. Dumstme is a dummy variable that equals 1 when 
stdefault score is between 0.0425 and 0.1672, and 0 otherwise. Dumstlo is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if stdefault exceeds 0.1672. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets. Dumman equals 1 
if the firm belongs to the manufacturing industry. Dumwho equals one if the firm belongs to the 
wholesale industry. Dumret equals one if the firm belongs to the retail industry. Dumcat equals one if the 
firm belongs to the catering industry. 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level respectively. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Independent variable Expected 
sign 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept  0.34 
(9.65)*** 
0.35 
(9.72)*** 
0.38 
(12.11)*** 
0.18 
(4.54)*** 
Asset maturity + 0.70 
(31.10)*** 
0.70 
(31.21)*** 
0.68 
(30.35)*** 
0.68 
(30.30)*** 
Asset growth - -0.05 
(-1.17) 
  -0.05 
(-1.08) 
Capital expenditures -  -0.07 
(-1.84)* 
-0.07 
(-1.90)* 
 
Stdefault + -0.61 
(-5.40)*** 
-0.62 
(-5.43)*** 
-0.64 
(-5.77)*** 
 
Stdefault² - 0.39 
(2.36)*** 
0.40 
(2.40)*** 
0.41 
(2.51)*** 
 
Dumsthi     0.20 
(9.59)*** 
Dumstme     0.12 
(6.41)*** 
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Table 6: Results of cross-sectional regressions 
Total assets + -0.03 
(-4.80)*** 
-0.02 
(-4.80)*** 
  
Added value +   -0.02 
(3.50)*** 
-0.03 
(-10.79)*** 
Leverage  0.02 
(0.66) 
0.02 
(0.68) 
0.045 
(1.29) 
0.03 
(1.98)** 
Dumman  0.03 
(1.92)** 
0.04 
(1.93)** 
0.03 
(1.81)* 
0.01 
(1.47) 
Dumwho  -0.04 
(-1.99)** 
-0.04 
(-2.02)** 
-0.05 
(-2.62)*** 
-0.05 
(-5.04)*** 
Dumret  0.02 
(1.34) 
0.02 
(1.35) 
0.02 
(1.11) 
-0.02 
(-2.04)** 
Dumcat  0.00 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(-0.08) 
0.02 
(0.56) 
-0.05 
(-3.56)*** 
Adjusted R²  45.21% 44.98% 45.84% 44.74% 
 
The dependent variable %Long-term debt is the percentage of total debt that was issued with a long-term 
intention—that is, debt that matures in more than one year plus debt that matures this year but that had 
an original maturity of more than one year. Asset maturity is the percentage of total assets that are fixed. 
Asset growth is the geometric average of growth in total assets for the three preceding years (in 
percentage terms). Capital expenditures is the ratio of capital expenditures this year divided by total 
assets of this year (in percentage terms). Ln(Total assets) equals the natural logarithm of total assets, 
ln(added value) equals the natural logarithm of added value. Stdefault is one minus the OJD score 
(between 0 and 1), stdefault² is the square of stdefault. Dumsthi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when  
stdefault score is below 0.0425, and 0 otherwise. Dumstme is a dummy variable that equals 1 when 
stdefault score is between 0.0425 and 0.1672, and 0 otherwise. Dumstlo is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if stdefault exceeds 0.1672. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets. Dumman equals 1 
if the firm belongs to the manufacturing industry. Dumwho equals one if the firm belongs to the 
wholesale industry. Dumret equals one if the firm belongs to the retail industry. Dumcat equals one if the 
firm belongs to the catering industry. 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level respectively. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
Independent variable Expected 
sign 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
Intercept  0.91 
(22.18)*** 
0.91 
(22.24)*** 
0.84 
(23.48)*** 
0.21 
(10.81)*** 
Asset maturity  + 0.45 
(17.53)*** 
0.45 
(17.53)*** 
0.43 
(16.63)*** 
0.65 
(55.58)*** 
Asset growth - 0.02 
(0.31) 
 0.01 
(0.03) 
 
Capital expenditures -  -0.03 
(-0.69) 
 -0.03 
(-1.92)* 
Stdefault + -1.26 
(-9.77)*** 
-1.27 
(-9.84)*** 
-1.32 
(-10.20)*** 
 
Stdefault² - 0.95 
(5.00)*** 
0.95 
(5.04)*** 
1.01 
(5.32)*** 
 
Dumsthi -    0.16 
(16.92)*** 
Dumstme     0.09 
(12.11)*** 
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Figure 1: Empirical relationship between short-term default and debt maturity 
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This figure graphically represents the relation between short-term default and the percentage long-term debt, 
based on the coefficients found in the regression analysis.      
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